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The Rise and Fall of the Centrality Concern in Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
 
Sean J. Young 
 
Abstract. In 1990, Smith changed the landscape of free exercise jurisprudence and introduced 
what this Article describes as the “centrality concern”: the principle that judges are in no place to 
determine the centrality of various activities to a particular religion.  However, no legal scholar 
has recognized the extent to which the centrality concern has been undermined.  This Article 
explains how Lukumi, Locke and most Circuits have undermined the centrality concern.  
Implications of this doctrinal anomaly will be illustrated with the example of the less often 
discussed religion of conservative Christianity, and the Article concludes with some initial 
recommendations. 
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According to free exercise of religion jurisprudence,1 judges are not supposed to be 
determining what activities are central to a particular religion.  Yet the legal literature has not 
taken notice of the extent to which courts and even the Supreme Court itself has undermined this 
principle.   
In 1990, Employment Division v. Smith2 changed the landscape of free exercise doctrine.  
Smith’s predecessor, Sherbert v. Verner,3 had held that a law placing a substantial burden on 
religious activity was required to demonstrate a compelling government interest.4  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority in Smith, criticized Sherbert because in requiring judges to determine 
whether there was a substantial burden on religion, judges had to, well, determine whether there 
was a substantial burden on religion.  This required judges to declare by fiat what activities were 
and were not central to a religion, an inquiry that involved an inappropriate intrusion into matters 
of the soul.  This principle will be referred to in this Article as the “centrality concern”: 
 
What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion 
that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith? . . .  Judging the centrality of 
different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative 
merits of differing religious claims. . . .  It is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds.  Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have 
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a 
religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.5 
 
Severely abrogating Sherbert, Smith established that regardless of their harmful effects on 
religion, laws that are neutral and of general applicability are presumptively constitutional.6  As a 
result, a state regulation against the ingestion of peyote was upheld despite its destructive effects 
on the religion of the Native American Church because it was neutral and generally applicable.7 
Scholars have debated the merits of the centrality concern.  Several agree with Smith’s 
rejection of Sherbert’s substantial burden inquiry on this basis.8  On the other hand, opponents of 
                                                          
1 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that the government “shall make no law . . . prohibiting 
the free exercise” of religion.  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
3 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
4 Id. at 402-03. 
5 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (citations and quotations omitted). 
6 “A law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even 
if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (summing up Smith).  For discussions of the history and evolution 
of free exercise doctrine, see Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi 
and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 851-52 (2001) (summarizing free exercise 
doctrine before and after Smith); Ernest P. Fronzuto, III, An Endorsement for the Test of General Applicability: 
Smith II, Justice Scalia, and the Conflict Between Neutral Laws and the Free Exercise of Religion, 6 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 713, 723-39 (1996) (summarizing free exercise doctrine from 1878 to the present). 
7 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-81.  For a further discussion of the facts of Smith, see Catherine Maxson, , “Their 
Preservation is Our Sacred Trust” – Judicially Mandated Free Exercise Exemptions to Historic Preservation 
Ordinances Under Employment Division v. Smith, 45 B.C. L. REV. 205, 221-23 (2003). 
8 See, e.g., Shira J. Schlaff, Using an Eruv to Untangle the Boundaries of the Supreme Court’s Religion-Clause 
Jurisprudence, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 890 (2003) (citing centrality concern to reject return to Sherbert); Joanne 
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Smith’s centrality concern argue that the Sherbert test only required courts to determine whether 
an activity is “religious,” which is a noncontroversial judicial determination;9 that courts can and 
should carry out a centrality analysis;10 or that institutional balancing prevents the centrality 
concern’s parade of horrors from coming into fruition.11  Still, others argue that the 
reasonableness of the centrality concern is irrelevant, because it does not outweigh the harms 
resulting from Smith’s severe curtailment of religious freedom.12 
No scholar, however, has recognized the extent to which the centrality concern has been 
eroded.  As a result of the fall of the centrality concern, there is much room for interpretative 
ambiguity and doctrinal contradiction over the role of religion-analysis in free exercise cases.  
Such anomalies allow free exercise litigants to raise arguments concerning the centrality of 
religious practices, knowing that courts are still secretly or overtly sympathetic to those 
arguments despite Smith’s centrality concern.   
Part I will describe how the 1993 Supreme Court case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah13 undermined the centrality concern in two subtle but significant 
ways.  Part II will explain how, over a decade later, the next Supreme Court free exercise case of 
Locke v. Davey14 further undermined the centrality concern by reanimating Sherbert.  Part III 
will show how in the meantime, the majority of Circuit courts have also undermined the 
centrality concern.  Part IV will illustrate the implications of these trends by applying the 
troubled free exercise doctrine to conservative Christianity, which is rarely discussed in the free 
exercise context.  This Article concludes with some brief recommendations on how the doctrine 
should proceed. 
 
I.  HOW LUKUMI UNDERMINED THE CENTRALITY CONCERN 
 
Lukumi subtly but significantly undermined the centrality concern in Smith by proposing 
two types of regulations that should be subject to strict scrutiny: selectively burdensome 
regulations and regulations motivated by legislative animus against a religion.  In discerning 
whether a regulation falls into one of these two categories, courts must implicitly or explicitly 
undermine Smith’s centrality concern.   
Because the Lukumi opinion itself was not a model of clarity, this Part must first 
demonstrate how Lukumi established the two types of regulations that were to be subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at its Word: The Implications of RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. 
REV. 5, 17 (1995) (defending centrality concern on basis of judicial right to self-restraint); Fronzuto, supra 6, 
at 758-59 (citing centrality concern in defense of Smith). 
9 Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the 
Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1952 (2001).  
10 Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 510 (1998); James 
M. Donovan, Restoring Free Exercise Protections by Limiting Them: Preventing a Repeat of Smith, 17 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 1, 31-35 (1996) (citing pre-Smith cases where Supreme Court had no problem conducting centrality analysis); 
Howard M. Friedman, Rethinking Free Exercise: Rediscovering Religious Community and Ritual, 24 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1800, 1805-06 (1994) (decrying court insensitivity to the weightiness of activities to certain religions). 
11 Shivakumar, supra 0, at 510. 
12 See infra 102 (for scholars holding this view). 
13 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
14 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
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A.  Rejecting the Empty Neutrality and General Applicability “Tests” in Lukumi  
 
The facts of Lukumi were straightforward: the city of Hialeah passed a series of 
ordinances banning animal sacrifice, and several adherents of Santeria, a religion requiring 
animal sacrifice, challenged the ordinances on free exercise grounds.15  And since Smith 
explained that neutral and generally applicable laws were presumptively constitutional but never 
explained how to apply those standards,16 Lukumi was responsible for taking on the task. 
A cursory structural analysis of the Lukumi opinion appears to show that Lukumi did 
accomplish this task.  First, it concluded that the regulations were not neutral.17  Second, it 
concluded that the regulations were not generally applicable.18  Lastly, since the regulation was 
neither neutral nor generally applicable,19 Lukumi subject the regulations to strict scrutiny.20   
Going beneath the surface, however, it becomes increasingly unclear whether Lukumi 
really did explain the separate neutrality and general applicability standards.  Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, acknowledged, “Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, 
and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that 
the other has not been satisfied.”  Three concurring Justices questioned the relevance of the 
distinction,21 Circuit courts have only adhered loosely to Lukumi language while ignoring or 
paying lip service to the distinction,22 and legal scholars reviewing free exercise jurisprudence 
treat the distinction with varying levels of weight.23  As one student  commented, “While 
                                                          
15 For a detailed account of the facts leading up to Lukumi as well as the disposition of the case, see generally Lino 
A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacrifice and Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1 (1996). 
16 “In Smith, the Court assumed—without analysis—that the Oregon peyote law was ‘an across-the-board criminal 
prohibition o[f] a particular form of conduct.’  Thus, there was no need to distinguish and precisely define the 
concepts of neutrality and general applicability.”  Duncan, supra 6, at 859 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).  
“The meaning of the general applicability principle was . . . not clearly developed in the governing cases [from 1997 
onwards].  Smith did not explain how to identify laws that fail the test.”  Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 
215 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
17 Neutrality was discussed in Section II-A.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532-42 (“. . .  In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads 
to one conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.”). 
18 General applicability was discussed in Section II-B.  Id. at 542-46 (“We turn next to a second requirement of the 
Free Exercise Clause, the rule that laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. . . .”). 
19 Technically, a law that fails either neutrality or general applicability should be subject to strict scrutiny.  So an 
even more straightforward application would have jumped to strict scrutiny immediately after concluding the 
regulations were not neutral. 
20 Strict scrutiny was applied in Section III.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47 (“A law burdening religious practice that is 
not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. . . .”). 
21 “If it were necessary to make a clear distinction between the two terms, I would draw a line somewhat different 
from the Court’s.  But I think it is not necessary, and would frankly acknowledge that the terms are not only 
interrelated, but substantially overlap.”  Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  “[T]he Court, until 
today, has not used exactly that term [‘general applicability’] in stating a reason for invalidation.”  Id. at 560 (Souter, 
J., concurring).  See also id. at 577-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (rejecting the neutrality and general applicability 
analysis in favor of underinclusive/overinclusive analysis). 
22 See, e.g., Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 365 F.3d 1156, 1171 (D.C.Cir. 2004) 
(ignoring general applicability and focusing only on “extreme burdens” to religious faith); KDM v. Reedsport 
School District, 196 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (ignoring general applicability and focusing on existence of 
animus and/or an “impermissible burden” on religious faith); San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 
F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (briefly summarizing the entire Lukumi test without distinguishing between 
neutrality and general applicability); and Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 978 (6th Cir. 1995) (same). 
23 See, e.g., Duncan, supra 6, at 863 (noting Lukumi’s distinction without explaining it); Renee Skinner, 
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 259 (1994) (“Kennedy refused to address what would be a generally applicable law and instead provided a 
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the overall vote reflects a 9-0 decision, the internal reasoning was far from unanimous or even 
cohesive.”24 
Therefore, it is less helpful to mechanically dissect the opinion to discern when a 
regulation is considered “neutral” or “generally applicable” and therefore constitutional.  Instead, 
this Part will describe the two types of regulations that Lukumi described throughout its 
byzantine opinion as unconstitutional.25  
 
B.  Two Types of Unconstitutional Regulations 
 
Kennedy’s characterization of the type of regulations that are unconstitutional relies a 
great deal on seemingly intuitive terminology and concepts without specifically explaining what 
they mean, and unfortunately, much of the legal literature reviewing Lukumi interpret it by 
parroting this meandering approach.26  Therefore, this section will specify the underlying concept 
behind much of Kennedy’s terminology. 
 
1.  “Selectively burdensome regulations” 
 
Most of the repeated concepts and terms are employed to denounce regulations that are 
unconstitutional because the activity they proscribe is almost entirely made up of activity 
practiced for religious reasons.  (This Article will refer to such regulations as “selectively 
burdensome regulations” for the sake of simplicity.)  Determining whether a regulation is 
selectively burdensome first requires an examination of the sphere of activity being regulated.  
Then, the portion of this sphere of regulated activity that comprises actions motivated by religion 
is measured.  If this portion nearly encompasses the entire sphere of regulated activity, then the 
regulation is selectively burdensome.27  This type of regulation was illustrated by Kennedy in a 
myriad of ways. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
simple conclusory assertion that these ordinances are not generally applicable”); Maxson, supra 7, at 224-25 
(summarizing Lukumi without making clear distinction between neutrality and general applicability); Gabrielle 
Giselle Davidson, , The “Extreme and Hypothetical” Come to Life: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 641, 662-668 (1994) (treating neutrality and general applicability separately). 
24 Skinner, supra 23, at 260.  “Imprecision of statement fostered confusion in the Court's discussion of the 
applicable law.”  Graglia, supra 5, at 33. 
25 This Article adopts the general assumption that regulations subject to strict scrutiny will fail the test and therefore 
be unconstitutional, primarily for the sake of rhetorical efficiency.  While not all regulations subject to strict scrutiny 
will fail, the strict scrutiny concept is doctrinally independent of the issues examined in this Article. 
26 See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69 TUL. L. REV. 335, 
341-43 (1994); R. Ted Cruz, Animal Sacrifice and Equal Protection Free Exercise: Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993), 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 262, 265-67 (1994); Laura A. 
Colombell, , Retracting First Amendment Jurisprudence Under the Free Exercise Clause: Culmination in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah and Resolution in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1127, 1144-47 (1993).  The lack of specificity is probably due to the easy nature of the case.  
See infra 85. 
27  In this scenario, it does not matter what the stated or hidden purpose of the legislators were; in fact, it is assumed 
that the purposes are legitimate.  “The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a 
selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the 
rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 543 (1993) (emphasis added). 
Rise and Fall of the Centrality Concern in Free Exercise Jurisprudence Sean J. Young 
 6
First, this concept was supported by the line of First Amendment cases that Kennedy 
cited as models for determining whether a regulation was generally applicable.28  In each case, 
the regulated activity was entirely practiced by a constitutionally protected group.  For example, 
a law imposing a use tax on the use of “paper and ink products exceeding $100,000 in any 
calendar year, used or consumed in producing a publication”29 was subject to strict scrutiny, 
because it “singled out the press for special treatment.”30  Another law exempting religious 
organizations that received more than half of their total contributions from members or affiliated 
organizations from a regulation was subject to strict scrutiny, because “[i]t is plain that the 
principal effect of the fifty per cent rule . . . is to impose the registration and reporting 
requirements of the Act on some religious organizations but not on others.”31 
Second, this concept was captured by the “religious gerrymander” doctrine that Kennedy 
repeatedly invoked:  “The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental 
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.”32  This term was originally penned 
by Justice Harlan, who described religious gerrymandering as a way to determine “whether the 
circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that 
religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.”33  Again, the focus 
was on the activities that the regulation prohibits and whether those activities are predominantly 
practiced by religious institutions.  As applied in Lukumi: “[A]lmost the only conduct subject to 
Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71 is the religious exercise of Santeria church members. . . . 
The net result of the gerrymander is that few if any killings of animals are prohibited other than 
Santeria sacrifice.”34   
Third, Kennedy repeatedly denounced regulations that “target” religion or regulations 
whose “object” is the suppression of religion.  Kennedy employed the terms “target” and 
“object” interchangeably and frequently throughout the opinion without defining them.  In some 
cases, these terms were employed to communicate the concept of selectively burdensome 
regulations.35  In other instances, Kennedy employed the terms to illustrate the process for 
determining whether a regulation is selectively burdensome – examining both the text of the 
                                                          
28 “The principle underlying the general applicability requirement has parallels in . . . First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”  Id. 
29 Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 578 n.2 (1983). 
30 Id. at 582. 
31 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253 (1982). 
32 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (citing Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1425 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
33 Walz, 90 S.Ct. at 1425 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
34 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535-36.   
35 “There are, of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of 
religion or religious conduct.”  Id. at 533. “The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the 
central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances.”  Id. at 534.  “Official action that 
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of 
facial neutrality.”  Id.  “The design of these laws accomplishes instead a ‘religious gerrymander,’ an impermissible 
attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices.”  Id. at 535 (internal citations omitted).  “It would be 
implausible to suggest that the three other ordinances, but not Ordinance 87-72, had as their object the suppression 
of religion.”  Id. at 540.  “The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.”  Id. at 542.  “A law that 
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct 
with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”  Id. at 546.   
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regulation (to see which activities are proscribed) and how the text is applied (to see whether the 
activities actually proscribed comprise solely religious activity).36 
Lastly, at one point Kennedy specifically cited Smith’s characterization of 
unconstitutional regulations,37 which also illustrated the concept of the selectively burdensome 
regulation.  The section of Smith cited by Kennedy held that a state would be violating free 
exercise if it banned activities “only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only 
because of the religious belief that they display.”38  Therefore, regulations which restrict only 
activities that are religious are constitutionally suspect.  Smith gave the examples of a regulation 
forbidding the “casting of statues that are to be used for worship purposes, or to prohibit bowing 
down before a golden calf.”39  In each of those examples, Scalia specifically inserted a religious 
component (“used for worship purposes” and “bowing down”) in the hypothetical regulations 
such that it would only encompass activities that were religious. 
In sum, the bulk of the Lukumi opinion was devoted to castigating selectively 
burdensome regulations.40 
                                                          
36 “To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text”  Id. at 533.  “[T]hough use of the words ‘sacrifice’ 
and ‘ritual’ does not compel a finding of improper targeting of the Santeria religion, the choice of these words is 
support for our conclusion.”  Id. at 534.  “There are further respects in which the text of the city council's enactments 
discloses the improper attempt to target Santeria.”  Id.  “Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation 
is strong evidence of its object.”  Id. at 535.  “It becomes evident that these ordinances target Santeria sacrifice when 
the ordinances' operation is considered.”  Id.  “[A]dverse impact will not always lead to a finding of impermissible 
targeting.”  Id.  “[T]the ordinances by their own terms target this religious exercise”  Id. at 542. 
37 It is worth noting that the bulk of Smith described regulations that were constitutional, so that what Smith 
considered to be unconstitutional was not immediately apparent, excluding the two now well-known exceptions to 
the Smith rule.  If a regulation contains a system of individualized exemptions, or if the regulation implicates the free 
exercise of religion in addition to another constitutional right (the “hybrid” rights doctrine), then strict scrutiny 
applies.  The bulk of free exercise literature discussing the inconsistency of the free exercise doctrine focuses on 
these exemptions.  “Is the exempted secular activity really analogous to the religious claimant’s activity? The 
literature is dominated by the incarnations of this question; it usually takes the form of a commentator pondering 
how numerous and severe the secular exceptions have to be before the law is considered not generally applicable.  
This question is one that has dominated the free exercise literature.”  Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of 
Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. L.J. & PUB. 
POL’Y 627, 639 (2003).  See also id. at 639-44 (surveying the literature on the individualized exemptions exception).  
“The hybrid-rights doctrine has been routinely criticized as untenable, and its adoption has often been viewed as the 
way the Smith Court chose to avoid having to overrule previous cases.  Some circuit courts, believing it fatally 
flawed, have ignored it completely.  A whole generation of student has followed the hybrid-rights exception 
closely; the consensus seems to be that the doctrine is of little use to religious claimants.  Lastly, even its originator, 
Justice Scalia, seems to have given up on the idea.”  Id. at 630-31 (citing cases and scholars).  Therefore, this Article 
does not discuss them. 
38 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
39 Id. at 878. 
40 Many interpretations of Lukumi focus on its tests of “underinclusivity” and “overinclusivity.”  See, e.g., Duncan, 
supra , at 868-89 (describing underinclusivity); Colombell, supra 6, at 1147 (describing 
overinclusivity). In these tests, the court examines the proffered legislative interest behind the regulation and decides 
whether the interest is overinclusive in that it restricts more activity than necessary, or whether it is underinclusive in 
that it does not restrict enough activity.  These analyses are meant to expose the proffered legislative interests as a 
sham.  However, since the selectively burdensome inquiry assumes that the legislative interests are legitimate, see 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993) (“The principle that 
government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct 
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause”) 
(emphasis added), it does not appear as necessary to prove underinclusivity or overinclusivity.  Furthermore, it is 
relatively easy to proffer legitimate legislative interests.  Lastly, these concepts often blend into Smith’s 
“individualized exemptions” doctrine, which is outside the scope of this Article.  See Duncan, supra 6, at 
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2.  Regulations motivated by animus towards religion 
 
The second type of regulation is unconstitutional because the legislators drafting the 
regulateon had specific animus towards a religion.  Completely unlike the first type of regulation, 
the motives of the legislators matter.  And under this analysis, it does not matter what the 
regulation actually regulates (although it is fair to assume that if an entire legislature has animus 
towards a religion, they will focus the regulation on the activities of that religion). 
This is perhaps the clearest part of the opinion, since Kennedy explicitly devoted a 
separate section, Section II-A-2, to describe this inquiry.41  Incorporating the animus doctrine 
from Equal Protection jurisprudence, he described a series of comments from city council 
members displaying manifest animus against the Santeria religion.42  (Confusingly, the word 
“object,” used earlier to describe selectively burdensome regulations, was used in this section to 
describe animus as well.)43   
The animus concept made its appearance in other parts outside Section II-A-2 as well.  
“The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as 
overt.”44  Kennedy acknowledged that the regulation “does implicate, of course, multiple 
concerns unrelated to religious animosity,”45 and in summing the neutrality test, he reiterated, 
“The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious 
practices.”46  His conclusion also strictly warned that such regulations would be suspect “upon 
even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or 
distrust of its practices.”47 
It is also possible that at the point where Kennedy cited Smith’s characterization of 
unconstitutional regulations, he actually construed Smith to be denouncing regulations motivated 
by animus.48  Kennedy’s adaptation of Smith’s formulation was slightly different: “if the object 
of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is 
not neutral.”49  In Kennedy’s adaptation, “because of” modifies the act of restricting, so if a 
legislature restricts practices “because of” the “religious motivation” behind the practices, then it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
872-74 (describing Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999), which applies underinclusivity analysis as conflated with 
the individualized exemptions doctrine).  See also supra 37 (describing individualized exemptions doctrine). 
41 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540-42. 
42 See id. 
43 “In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in 
our equal protection cases.”  Id. at 540.  “Here, as in equal protection cases, we may determine the city council's 
object from both direct and circumstantial evidence.”  Id.  “These objective factors bear on the question of 
discriminatory object.”  Id. 
44 Id. at 534. 
45 Id. at 535.  
46 Id. at 542. 
47 Id. at 547. 
48 If this was Kennedy’s interpretation of Smith, it would be wrong, since Scalia, the author of Smith, has repeatedly 
denounced the animus inquiry.  “As I have  elsewhere, it is virtually impossible to determine the singular 
‘motive’ of a collective legislative body.”  Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578, 636-639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  “The Court does not explain why the legislature’s motive matters, and 
I fail to see why it should.”  Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 732 (Scalia J., dissenting).  Of course, the Supreme 
Court often reinterprets past decisions. 
49 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).  This adaptation is repeated 
twice.  “[T]he protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law . . . regulates or prohibits conduct because it 
is undertaken for religious reasons.”  Id. at 532. “[A suspect regulation] seeks not to effectuate the stated 
governmental interests, but to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation”  Id. at 538.   
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means that something about the religious motivation incited the legislature to restrict the activity.  
In other words, the legislature possesses an animus towards that religion.  This interpretation’s 
validity is strengthened by the fact that Kennedy then explicitly adopted the “because of” 
phraseology in Section II-A-2.50 
 
C.  How Each Type of Inquiry Undermines the Centrality Concern 
  
Having established the two types of regulations that Lukumi denounced as 
unconstitutional, this Part now turns to how challenging regulations as falling into one of these 
two categories undermines the centrality concern. 
 
1.  Challenging selectively burdensome regulations requires a centrality inquiry to 
determine what activities are religious 
 
When a class of persons claims that a regulation is selectively burdensome, they claim 
that the regulation has encircled a set of activities that is exclusively “religious.”  However, in 
hearing this very claim, the court must determine, implicitly or explicitly, whether such 
“religious” activities are central to the corresponding religion, directly undermining the centrality 
concern in Smith.  A religion is not an indivisible unit; it invariably consists of activities that are 
central and activities that are not.  Activities central to a religion tend to be undisputedly a part of 
that religion by both insiders and outsiders of that religion,51 whereas activities that are not 
central to a religion are more contested, again by both insiders and outsiders of that religion.52  If 
a regulation restricts activities that are a part of religion but not central to it, it is difficult to show 
that such a regulation is selectively burdensome when even adherents within that religion are not 
clear on the religiosity of the action.  
It is telling that Kennedy felt compelled to justify the centrality of animal sacrifice to 
Santeria.  Looking to religious tradition, Kennedy specifically that “[t]he sacrifice of 
animals as part of religious rituals has ancient roots.”53  “Given the historical association 
between animal sacrifice and religious worship, petitioners’ assertion that animal sacrifice is an 
integral part of their religion cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible.”54  In other words, he was 
                                                          
50 Id. at 540 (“That the ordinances were enacted ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’ their suppression of Santeria 
religious practice . . .”); id. at 542 (“This history discloses the object of the ordinances to target animal sacrifice by 
Santeria worshippers because of its religious motivation.”).  Regardless of whether Kennedy used “because of” to 
describe selectively burdensome regulations or regulations motivated by animus, this Article covers both 
interpretations.  This dual interpretation of “because of” has been articulated in the race context.  In interpreting the 
terms “because of race,” the Seventh Circuit stated:  “The narrow view of the phrase is that a party cannot commit 
an act ‘because of race’ unless he intends to discriminate between races [similar to animus]. . . .  The broad view is 
that a party commits an act ‘because of race’ whenever the natural and foreseeable consequence of that act is to 
discriminate between races, regardless of his intent [similar to selectively burdensome regulations].”  Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1025 (1978). 
51 For instance, the veneration of Mary is arguably central to Catholicism, as evidenced by the fact that few self-
identified Catholics would dispute her veneration. 
52 For instance, the ban on the use of birth control is arguably not central to Catholicism, as evidenced by the fact 
that Catholicism’s official ban on the use of birth control is often ignored by many Catholics.  See generally Frank D. 
Royland, Many Catholics Who Loved Pope Ignored His Ban on Birth Control, THE BALTIMORE SUN, April 17, 2005, 
at http://www.postgazette.com/pg/05107/489014.stm.   
53 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524. 
54 Id. at 531 (citations omitted). 
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determining whether animal sacrifice was sufficiently central to the Santeria religion.  He did not 
stop there, however; while giving tradition tremendous weight in determining what activities 
were sufficiently religious in Santeria, he granted a special dispensation to Islam, noting that 
animal sacrifice was also a part of “modern Islam.”55  Perhaps Kennedy felt that it was entirely 
within the “judicial ken”56 to determine what activities carry weight in different religions.  
Regardless of Kennedy’s motivations for this section, establishing the centrality of animal 
sacrifice to Santeria was necessary to hold the Hialeah ordinances to be selectively burdensome.  
It is true that there is an uncontroversial “sincerity” inquiry in cases involving religion.  
The plaintiff often has to meet a threshold test showing that her religious claims are genuine and 
not a sham.  For instance, in Hartmann v. Stone,57 a Sixth Circuit case, the plaintiff had to show a 
“sufficient interest” in their free exercise right to send their children to a Christian day care 
center.58  Lukumi itself also alluded to such an inquiry.59  However, the sincerity inquiry is an 
individual inquiry – it examines whether the individuals are sincere in their claim.  Claiming that 
a regulation is selectively burdensome requires showing that it restricts not activities practiced by 
one person,60 but activities central to the religion of a collective religious body.  Furthermore, 
Lukumi had little to do with sincerity – Kennedy did not remand the case to determine whether or 
not every Santeria adherent in the city of Hialeah had sincere religious beliefs, for instance.  
Instead, he determined that animal sacrifice was central to the operation of Santeria.  “The record 
in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria 
worship service was the object of the ordinances.”61 
 
2.  Challenging regulations motivated by animus towards religion requires 
determining the centrality of actions or ideology to religion 
 
Furthermore, challenging regulations motivated by anti-religion animus also requires 
courts to determine what is central to a religion.  As stated previously, Kennedy imported the 
animus doctrine from Equal Protection jurisprudence to describe the second type of 
unconstitutional regulation.  Specifically, he cited Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney,62 
a sex discrimination case that ruled that regulations passed “because of” its “adverse effects upon 
an identifiable group [here, women]” were unconstitutional, whereas regulations passed “in spite 
of” the harm towards women were constitutional.63  Applied to free exercise cases, regulations 
passed “because of” their suppression of a religious practice would be subject to strict scrutiny.64 
                                                          
55 Id. at 525 (emphasis added). 
56 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
57 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995). 
58 Id. at 979 n.4 (determining that involving children in activities with religious content is a sufficient interest).  See 
also Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 170 (3rd Cir. 2002) (determining that inability 
to attend synagogue on the Sabbath without an eruv “easily suffices” for purposes of the sufficient interest test).  
59 “Neither the city nor the courts below, moreover, have questioned the sincerity of petitioners’ professed desire to 
conduct animal sacrifices for religious reasons.  We must consider petitioners’ First Amendment claim.”  Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). 
60 Claiming that a regulation was so designed as to restrict the activities of a single person is more akin to a “class of 
one” Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.  See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
61 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534. 
62 442 U.S. 256 (1979).   
63 Id. at 279. 
64 This formulation is borrowed directly from Lukumi:  “[T]he ordinances were enacted ‘because of,’ not merely 'in 
spite of,’ their suppression of Santeria religious practice.”  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (quotations omitted). 
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In the sex context, the target of the animus can either be women themselves or the actions 
of women.  The latter type of animus is not focused upon as much, but it applies most often in 
the employment context, when supervisors expect female employees to act in a way that 
conforms to a gender stereotype.65  The contours of this doctrine are outside the scope of this 
Article, but it is sufficient to  that in this latter inquiry, courts must make an implicit 
determination of whether the expectation is a gender stereotype.  This implicit determination is 
not always acknowledged perhaps because it is usually apparent when such a stereotype exists.66   
The religion context is similar, though there are three possible targets of the animus – the 
adherents of a religion,67 the actions of that religion, and the ideology68 of that religion.  For 
instance, when one of the Hialeah council members stated that in prerevolution Cuba, “people 
were put in jail for practicing [Santeria]” and the audience applauded,69 this was an example of 
animus towards the adherents of a religion.  The part of the Hialeah resolution stating that “[t]his 
community will not tolerate religious practices which are abhorrent to its citizens . . .”70 was an 
example of animus towards the actions of a religion.  And the comment by the police department 
chaplain that Santeria was a “sin, foolishness, an abomination to the Lord, and the worship of 
demons”71 was an example of animus towards the ideology of a religion.  It is the latter two 
forms of animus that undermine the centrality concern. 
Assume that in a free exercise case, a class of plaintiffs presents a series of comments 
made by legislators to support their claim of animus.  In response, the defendants claim that they 
did not desire to harm the adherents of the religion or hate the religion per se, but that they 
merely opposed the actions of the religion as against public morals.  Furthermore, they claim that 
they opposed its ideology as a political matter, just as they might oppose the ideology of a 
political party.  After all, even the most vitriolic hostility towards the tenets of the Republican 
Party, for instance, does not render a regulation unconstitutional. 
In response to this defense, the plaintiffs can state that there is simply no practical 
difference in stating that animus was exhibited “merely” towards the actions and ideology of a 
religion and not the religion itself (or its adherents, for that matter).  After all, in Lukumi, 
Kennedy did not make these distinctions.  Like many reasonably minded people, he recognized 
that animus towards an action or ideology of a religion is practically inseparable from animus 
towards the adherents of that religion.  The following statement from Lukumi illustrates this 
inseparability:  “Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, religious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit 
                                                          
65 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
66 “Judge Gesell also found, however, that sexual stereotyping influenced the firm's decision to deny her partnership. 
One partner described her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a woman’; a third 
advised her to take 'a course at charm school.  Most critically, Thomas Beyer, the partner who explained to Hopkins 
why the Policy Board had shelved her candidacy for partnership, told her that she should ‘walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”  Kenneth R. 
Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 859, 871 (2004) (quotations omitted).  
67 This Article assumes functional inseparability between “the religion itself” and the adherents of that religion, 
similar to the functional inseparability between “the female gender” and women. 
68 Ideology is defined in this Article as a “set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic, or 
other system.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 4th ed. (2000), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=ideology (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
69 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 541. 
70 Id. at 542. 
71 Id. at 541 (quotations omitted). 
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First Amendment protection.”72  To hold otherwise would be to validate the cliché, “hate the sin, 
love the sinner.”73  The evidence in the Lukumi case simply reinforces the point; even if each 
statement of animus were placed in separate categories, they were all cut from the same 
unconstitutional cloth of animus toward religion.  
The plaintiff response is reasonable, but it makes a key assumption: that the actions and 
ideology being attacked by the legislators are central to the religion.  Animus towards actions 
(i.e. public nudity) or animus towards ideology (i.e. Republican Party example) in and of 
themselves is perfectly legitimate.  In order to create the critical link between this legitimate 
animus to the illegitimate animus against the religious adherents, there must be an existing link 
between the actions/ideology and the religion itself that is so constitutive of the religion as to be 
inseparable.  In other words, the actions or ideology must be central to that religion. 
The path to determining whether a regulation is unconstitutional under Lukumi requires a 
centrality analysis, and how Lukumi undermined the centrality concern in this way was subtle but 
significant.  However, the next Supreme Court free exercise case was much bolder. 
 
II.  HOW LOCKE UNDERMINED THE CENTRALITY CONCERN 
 
The erosion of the centrality concern was further advanced with the Court’s next post-
Smith free exercise case over a decade later, Locke.  Decided in 2004, Locke held that a 
Washington statute creating a college scholarship program was constitutional despite the fact that 
it explicitly excluded students pursuing a degree in devotional theology.74  In order to understand 
the Court’s continuing erosion of the centrality concern in Locke, one must realize that the 
underlying concern behind Sherbert is just as intuitively appealing as it was before Smith 
significantly curtailed its operation.  The concern behind Sherbert was simply that it would be 
wrong to force someone to endure a burden on their religion so great as to make them abandon 
the very precepts of their religion, which is hereinafter ed as the “preservation concern”.75   
 Although this preservation concern motivated the creation of the substantial burdens test 
of Sherbert,76 Smith’s virtual burial of Sherbert was unable to keep the preservation concern in 
its grave. 
 
                                                          
72 Id. at 531 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981), 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
73 This statement is sometimes employed by Christians who believe that homosexuality is a sin.  In response to some 
gay rights activists who accuse such Christians as harboring hatred towards gay people, some Christians will 
respond with the cliché, “hate the sin, love the sinner.”  In other words, they “hate” the sin of homosexuality but 
nonetheless “love” the practitioner of the sin, that is, the homosexual.  Some gay people find this distinction 
irrelevant. 
74 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 716 (2004).  For a more detailed discussion of the facts of Locke, see Martha 
McCarthy, Room for “Play in the Joints” – Locke v. Davey, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 457, 457-58 (2004). 
75 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (discussing the religious burden on plaintiff).  On the other hand, 
Kenneth Karst posits that neutrality is the intuition driving Sherbert.  Karst, supra 26, at 344 (“people who 
are harmed are sure to appeal to the nation’s general aspirations toward equal treatment, toward neutrality.  
Sherbert’s ‘strict scrutiny’ requirement responded to just such an appeal”).  But see Alan Brownstein, Interpreting 
the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values – a Critical Theory of “Neutrality 
Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 246-47 (1999) (critiquing 
neutrality theory).  Karst’s neutrality intuition examines the relative weight of burdens amongst different religions, 
whereas the preservation intuition examines the absolute weight of a burden on a religion. 
76 “Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of 
her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable.”  Sherbert, 374, U.S. at 404. 
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A.  Locke’s Resurrection of the Preservation Concern 
 
Locke encompassed several constitutional doctrines, as evidenced by the variety of 
interpretations made by the legal community.  Some have interpreted it as primarily a funding 
case,77 while scholars viewing it as a free exercise case focus on the way Locke appeared to 
change the definition of neutrality78 or the way it narrowed the entire free exercise inquiry into 
the issue of animus.79 
However, the literature has not recognized the most glaring feature of Locke: its virtual 
transformation of Smith-Lukumi’s neutrality test into Sherbert’s substantial burdens test.  When 
it supposedly applied Lukumi’s neutrality test, Locke analyzed the extent of the regulation’s 
burden on the claimant’s religion, a blatant Sherbert-style substantial burdens kind of analysis.  
The Court held that the Washington regulation did not lack facial neutrality because the burden 
placed upon [the Christian?] religion in Locke was far less than the burden that was placed upon 
Santeria in Lukumi: 
 
In Lukumi, the city of Hialeah made it a crime to engage in certain kinds of animal 
slaughter.  We found that the law sought to suppress ritualistic animal sacrifices of the 
Santeria religion.  In the present case, the State’s disfavor of religion (if it can be called 
that) is of a far milder kind.  It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of 
religious service or rite.  It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the 
political affairs of the community.  And it does not require students to choose between 
their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.  The State has merely chosen 
not to fund a distinct category of instruction.80 
 
The preservation concern won out: the burden was just not that bad.   
While plenty of scholars and treatises have recognized this curious use of burden-
differentiation to determine facial neutrality,81 they either gloss over this use82 or conflate it with 
                                                          
77 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the 
Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 162 (2004) (“Davey is a funding case.  It authorizes 
discriminatory funding, but it does not authorize discriminatory regulation, and it does little to clarify the [religious] 
regulation cases.”); Susanna Dokupil, Function Follows Form: Locke v. Davey’s Unnecessary Parsing, 2004 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 327 (2004) (“[P]rivate parochial schools remain at the center of the debate [over school choice]. . . . 
Locke v. Davey is a case at the heart of that debate.”). 
78 “They read Lukumi to mean that any time a statute even mentions religion, or uses religion or houses of worship 
as a separate category within its framework, strict scrutiny must automatically be applied.  This position was always 
wrong, and the Court was right to repudiate it in Locke.”  Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court Issues a Monumental 
Decision: Equal State Scholarship Access for Theology Students Is Not Required by the Free Exercise Clause, 
FINDLAW (Feb. 27, 2004), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20040227.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).  
“Locke should be just the sort of rare case contemplated in Smith.  The scholarship program is anything but 
generally applicable as applied to Davey.”  Bernard James, First Amendment, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Aug. 2, 
2004, at S10. 
79 See, e.g., Andrew A. Beerworth, Religion in the Marketplace: Establishments, Pluralisms, and the Doctrinal 
Eclipse of Free Exercise, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 333, 385 (2004); Hamilton, supra 8.  
80 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720-21 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
81 Even though Laycock argues that Locke is not a free exercise case along the lines of Smith-Lukumi, he still 
arrives at the same conclusion: “[F]acial discrimination against religion is presumptively unconstitutional if, and 
only if, the discrimination burdens a religious practice.  There are multiple ways to show such a burden, but . . . a 
mere refusal to fund does not impose a substantial burden.”  Laycock, supra 77, at 214 (emphasis added).  
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a finding of animus,83 even though animus is not mentioned in this section at all.  None have 
made the implicit connection to Sherbert. 
Animated by the preservation concern, Locke essentially placed itself on one end and 
Lukumi on the other end of a spectrum of religious burdens.  On the one end is a harmless 
regulation; one that prevents some members of a religion from obtaining some money to help 
them become clergy.  On the other end is a regulation that outright prohibits a religion from 
conducting worship services central to its functioning as a faith.  Locke’s facial neutrality test 
became Sherbert’s substantial burdens test: Regulations on the Locke end of the spectrum are 
mild and permissible, while those on the Lukumi end are harsh and impermissible. 
 
B.  Tracing the Preservation Concern from Smith to Lukumi to Locke 
 
Locke’s reanimation of Sherbert’s preservation concern and its disregard of Smith’s 
centrality concern can be traced to the curious operation of Smith vis-à-vis Lukumi. 
Smith was a difficult case.  An Oregon regulation banned the use of peyote, despite the 
fact that peyote use was central to the religion of the Native American church.  While an 
ordinary person might not wish to see the Native American church virtually eliminated by the 
regulation (the preservation concern),84 Smith held that a judge would have to rise above this 
natural concern, see that the regulation was neutral and generally applicable, and rule that it was 
therefore valid, for it is inappropriate for judges to act as clergy (the centrality concern).  
Lukumi was not a difficult case.  In one sense, Lukumi “spoiled” the Court – it was the 
Court’s first opportunity to implement Smith’s difficult new dynamic, but the facts of the case 
were so easy85 that the Court did not have to.  As Lino Graglia es, “The Justices' purported 
finding of religious persecution by the people of Hialeah certainly made for an easy case, 
essentially leaving nothing for the Court to decide. Specifically, it enabled the Court to avoid 
considering the application of its unpopular Smith decision of three years earlier.”86  Both the 
preservation concern—the intuitive desire to prevent the elimination of the Santeria church—and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
82 “Seven Justices, in Locke, did not believe that the denial of aid imposed any real burdens on persons based on 
their religious beliefs.”  5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – 
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 21:6 (4rd ed. Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).  See also Beerworth, supra 9, at 
382 (“Evidently, a longing to obtain a theological degree does not qualify as a ‘religious conviction.’”); Carlos S. 
Montoya, Locke v. Davey and the “Play in the Joints” Between the Religion Clauses, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1159, 
1165, 1173 (2004) (citing Locke’s limiting of neutrality to when “a statute was enacted to burden religion”). 
83 Id. at 1173 (citing Locke’s limiting of neutrality to “cases where there is evidence of animus towards religion”).  
See also Hamilton, supra 78 (interpreting this as using the weightiness of the burden as evidence of whether 
animus existed).  Though I ultimately agree that animus is a determining factor, I disagree with Hamilton’s 
reasoning.  Her interpretation ignores the fact that this paragraph makes no mention of animus and takes place prior 
to the discussion on taxpayer-funded clergy, which is prior to a specific discussion on animus.  
84 “It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage 
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which . . . judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the 
centrality of all religious beliefs.”  Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
85 “It is only in the rare case that a state or local legislature will enact a law directly burdening religious practice as 
such.  Because respondent here does single out religion in this way, the present case is an easy one to decide.”  
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 580 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted).  “In Hialeah, however, the Court not only reached the surprising conclusion that the city's ban on animal 
sacrifice was unconstitutional, but it did so unanimously and with apparent ease.  The decision was so easy . . .”  
Graglia, supra note 15, at 3. 
86 Id. at 30. 
Rise and Fall of the Centrality Concern in Free Exercise Jurisprudence Sean J. Young 
 15
the centrality concern—restraint from judging whether animal sacrifice was central to Santeria—
could be satisfied, and they were not at odds.  Because the regulation was so blatantly 
unconscionable, Smith allowed the Court to save Santeria without a guilty conscience; as judges, 
they stayed the course and did not act inappropriately as clergy.87 
Ten years after Lukumi, Locke arrived with a set of facts that exactly fit the sort of 
difficult case that Smith sought to equip the Court to handle.  A regulation prevented a student 
from receiving a few funds to help him become a minister.  Even though judges were not 
allowed to determine what activities were central to a religion, an ordinary observer would not be 
able to help but notice how light of a burden the Locke regulation imposed as compared to the 
one in Lukumi.88  Smith’s centrality concern required the Court to ignore the obvious lightness of 
the burden and strike down the law for not being facially neutral.  Nonetheless, the Court failed 
the test – without any experience over the past 14 years in suppressing the preservation concern, 
the Court apparently could not resist allowing the preservation concern to dominate the centrality 
concern in Locke.   
 
III.  HOW CIRCUIT COURTS HAVE UNDERMINED THE CENTRALITY CONCERN 
 
Lower courts have not fared much better at suppressing the preservation concern.  A 
pattern of Sherbert-style inquiries into substantial burdens existed in lower courts even after 
Smith. 
The Third Circuit has tattled on its sister Circuits’ post-Smith disregard of the centrality 
concern: “Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s admonition in Smith against judicial inquiries 
into the centrality of religious practices, a number of circuit courts persist in imposing a 
substantial burden requirement in various contexts.”89  The court’s list of circuits guilty of this 
violation included the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and the D.C. 
Circuits.  These cases smuggled in the substantial burden requirement through various cloaks: a 
threshold requirement,90 an exception for non-regulatory state actions,91 state constitutional 
requirements,92 and an exception for non-generally applicable regulations.93  Some blatantly 
ignored Smith or Lukumi altogether, imposing its own version of Sherbert.94 
                                                          
87 At least not explicitly.  As demonstrated earlier, Lukumi still managed to reanimate the centrality concern in subtle 
ways.  See supra Part I. 
88 One commentator, just before the Supreme Court decided Locke, recommended taking such an intuition into 
account:  
[The Scholarship’s] revocation did not restrict Davey’s right to pursue his religion or coerce him from its 
practice.  Rather, revoking the Scholarship made Davey’s choice of major slightly more expensive; after 
the revocation, Davey had to work fewer than three additional hours a week.  During these three hours, 
Davey could not go to class, study, or associate with his fellow believers for worship. 
Katie Axtell, Note, Public Funding for Theological Training Under the Free Exercise Clause: Pragmatic 
Implications and Theoretical Questions Posed to the Supreme Court in Locke v. Davey, SEATTLE U. L. REV. 585, 
602 (2003).  See also Dokupil, supra note 77, at 340 (“in Lukumi, the law in question made a particular religious 
exercise illegal, while here, Washington merely excluded theology from a funding program, leaving Davey and 
other theology majors free to believe or worship however they wished”). 
89 See Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 171 n.31 (3d Cir. 2002) (listing post-Smith 
Circuit cases implementing substantial burden requirement).  See also Laycock, supra note 77, at 212 n.371-72 
(listing state cases applying pre-Smith law).   
90 Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C.Cir. 2002). 
91 Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002). 
92 Altman v. Minn. Dep’t of Corrections, 251 F.3d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying state constitutional free 
exercise provision that only applies to state action that “excessively burdens” religious beliefs). 
Rise and Fall of the Centrality Concern in Free Exercise Jurisprudence Sean J. Young 
 16
This Article will review a few cases that were not placed on the Third Circuit’s extensive 
catalogue of violations, and they should suffice to illustrate this point.  In 2004, the D.C. Circuit, 
ruling on a FCC radio broadcasting license policy, used the religious gerrymandering concept to 
examine both the extent of a burden on religion as well as whether the activity was “inherent” in 
the character of the religion.  “[T]he burden the point system foists on religious organizations is 
relatively modest. . . . [N]othing inherent in their religious character forces them to structure their 
networks in this way.”95 
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit created its own amalgamation of free exercise and 
establishment clause doctrine in order to evaluate whether a regulation would place an 
impermissible burden on a family’s religion.  KDM, a visually impaired student attending a 
sectarian school, was denied special education services.  However, the court felt that KDM’s 
situation wasn’t so detrimental to his religion, since the district was willing to provide adequate 
special education services at a fire hall down the street twice a week for ninety minutes.  
Furthermore, “he could safely travel there—indeed, the vision specialist comes to KDM’s school, 
picks him up and then returns him to his school. . . . In sum, there is no showing that application 
of the regulation to KDM’s case burdens KDM’s or his parents’ free exercise of their religion.”96 
Although the Eleventh Circuit specifically applied Smith-Lukumi in a 1994 case,97 it also 
concurrently examined the regulation’s burden on religion by applying its own circuit-specific 
free exercise doctrine as established by the older case of Grosz v. City of Miami Beach.98  The 
Grosz test required the court to balance the competing governmental and religious interests,99 
forcing the court to weigh the extent a government regulation was hurting a religion:  
 
The burden on First Assembly to either conform its shelter to the zoning laws, or to move 
the shelter to an appropriately zoned area, is less than the burden on the County were it to 
be forced to allow the zoning violation.  Thurs, under the Grosz test, First Assembly’s 
right to free exercise of religion is not violated by the County’s zoning ordinances.100 
 
While Sherbert’s substantial burdens test is certainly not being applied in its full form 
today, the preservation concern that animated Sherbert is still a significant undercurrent both in 
the Supreme Court and in most Circuits.  Defendants have an interest in depicting such regulated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
93 Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 173 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that non-generally 
applicable laws must substantially burden religion to be struck down); and Church of Scientology v. City of 
Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1542-49 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding regulation to not be generally applicable and to be under 
the category of regulations imposing substantial burdens). 
94 Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 79 (2nd Cir. 2001) (stating that when a neutral law incidentally 
restricts religion, apply the substantial burden test); Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying 
test examining whether government placed a substantial burden on a central belief or practice); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. 
Of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); and United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 793 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (applying a substantial burden test).  Carol Kaplan claims that Grant was an application of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), see Carol Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable 
Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1064 n.81 (2000), but I believe that Grant is at most 
ambiguous on this point.  See Grant, 117 F.3d at 792 n.6 (discussing the RFRA issue).  
95 Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 365 F.3d 1156, 1171 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (emphasis 
added). 
96 KDM v. Reedsport School District, 196 F.3d 1046, 1050(9th Cir. 1999). 
97 First Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994).  
98 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984). 
99 First Assembly of God of Naples, 20 F.3d at 424. 
100 Id. (emphasis added). 
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activities as having only a minimal Locke-level impact on the practitioners’ religion.  In light of 
Smith’s articulation of the centrality concern, one can infer that Smith never intended the doctrine 
to grow in this way.  Indeed, Scalia, the author of Smith, wrote the dissent in Locke which 
reinforced this point: 
 
The Court makes no serious attempt to defend the program’s neutrality, and instead 
identifies two features thought to render its discrimination less offensive.  The first is the 
lightness of Davey’s burden.  The Court offers no authority for approving facial 
discrimination against religion simply because its material consequences are not 
severe.101 
 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
 With such a significant erosion of the centrality concern, there are innumerable 
implications for the right to free exercise of religion in the United States.  Most of free exercise 
literature focuses on the impact of free exercise doctrine as applied to religious minorities.102  
This Article, therefore, will illustrate the implications of the fall of the centrality concern by 
applying the doctrine to conservative Christianity, which is often unconsidered.103 
 
A.  Sanctifying the Secular to Force Selectively Burdensome Regulations 
 
The erosion of the centrality concern creates a perverse incentive: activities that are 
traditionally secular may be characterized with enough religiosity to force a law that regulates 
the activity to constitute a selectively burdensome regulation.  And it can also appeal to the 
preservation concern that animates various courts.  While all religions may attempt this endeavor, 
conservative Christianity, as a majoritarian104 religion with the resources and resolve105 to 
influence mainstream culture, is most able to accomplish this task.  
 
1.  Subjecting a homosexual child to reparative therapy  
 
Reparative therapy, the practice by many licensed psychologists of “curing” homosexuals 
of their homosexuality, serves as a good example.  Although reparative therapy started as a 
                                                          
101 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 731 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
102 See, e.g., Gregory D. Wellons, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: The Melting of 
Sherbert Means a Chilling Effect on Religion, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 149, 173 (1991); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The New 
Religionists’ Newest Social Gospel: On the Rhetoric and Reality of Religions’ ‘Marginalization’ in Public Life, 51 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 54 (1996) (citing Smith’s negative impact on minority religions despite reasonableness of 
centrality concern); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions 
Against Polygamy are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 753-54 (2001) 
(despite centrality concern, anti-polygamy laws place unacceptable religious burden on some Mormons). 
103 Christianity has become more divided between conservative and liberal than it has amongst denominations.  
Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and Its Importance to the Law, 
51 BUFFALO L. REV. 127, 141-44 (2003) (tracing the development of the conservative-liberal split and the decline of 
denominationalism).  
104 The word “majoritarian” is used loosely.  In this case, it can either mean a numerical majority or simply 
possessing the political power that a minority religion would not otherwise have. 
105 French, supra note 103, at 144 (noting the trend that fundamentalist religions tend to adopt modern methods of 
operation). 
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secular and scientific endeavor in the 1930’s,106 it has become increasingly religious in part 
because of the way reparative therapy has been marginalized by the scientific community.107  
The strongest piece of evidence that secular reparative therapy exists in any substantial form 
today is the only secular organization mentioned by both proponents and opponents of reparative 
therapy – the National Association for Research and Treatment of Homosexuality (NARTH).108  
Although it would be speculative to surmise the extent to which NARTH members integrate 
religion in their reparative therapy, it is notable that “[t]he vast majority of its members are 
believed to be from the conservative wings of Christianity and Judaism,”109 that NARTH’s 
website devotes a section to “theological” perspectives,110 and that Joseph Nicolosi, the president 
of NARTH, is a ministry leader of the largest ex-gay ministry, Exodus International.111   
Karolyn Ann Hicks argues that parental attempts to change a child’s sexual orientation 
can legally constitute child abuse.112  Relying on Parham v. J.R.,113 which held that a parent may 
commit a child to a mental institution as long as a neutral fact finder employing medical 
standards permits it, Hicks suggests that because the American Psychiatric Association, the 
American Psychological Association, the American Psychoanalytic Association, and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics all reject reparative therapy; and because homosexuality has 
not been classified as a mental illness since 1973, a neutral fact finder can rely on established 
practice to find a parent’s use of reparative therapy on a child to be child abuse.114  
Under Hicks’ child abuse scenario, the strength of a parent’s free exercise claim depends 
on how religious reparative therapy is, since the neutral fact finder relies on position statements 
                                                          
106 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 794-98 (Jan 2002) (discussing history of reparative therapy 
starting in 1938). 
107 As Yoshino notes: “[T]he most high-profile contemporary purveyors of reparative therapy tend to be religious 
organizations.  These include fundamentalist Christian groups such as Homosexuals Anonymous, Metanoia 
Ministries, Love in Action, Exodus International, and EXIT of Melodyland.”  Id. at 800.  See also Karolyn Ann 
Hicks, “Reparative” Therapy: Whether Parental Attempts to Change a Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally 
Constitute Child Abuse, 49 AM. U.L. REV. 505, 531 (1999).  In 2000, the American Psychiatric Association 
recognized that “[i]n recent years, noted practitioners of ‘reparative’ therapy have openly integrated older 
psychoanalytic theories that pathologies homosexuality with traditional religious beliefs concerning homosexuality.”  
Fact Sheet, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 5, at 
http://www.psych.org/public_info/gaylesbianbisexualissues22701.pdf (last updated May 2000). 
108 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 106, at 799 n.144; Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual 
Orientation Reparative therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 226 (1999) (referring generally to both 
“religious and secular practitioners” and citing NARTH as its only example of a secular organization).  NARTH 
itself tries to maintain its scientific independence with the following disclaimer: “NARTH welcomes the support of 
all lay organizations, including religious groups, which turn to us for scientific evidence which may support their 
traditional doctrines. We remain, however, a professional organization devoted to scientific inquiry.”  Our Track 
Record, NARTH, at http://www.narth.com/menus/history.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) 
109 B.A. Robinson, Reparative Therapy: The National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, 
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE.ORG, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_nart.htm (last updated May 11, 2001). 
110 For a list of such articles, see http://www.narth.com/menus/ethical.html (last updated Dec. 30, 2004). 
111 Joseph Nicolosi sits on the “Speakers Bureau” of Exodus International, which comprises “[a] wide variety of 
Exodus ministry leaders.”  Speakers Bureau, EXODUS INTERNATIONAL, at http://exodus.to/speakers.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2005). 
112 Hicks, supra note 107, at 531. 
113 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
114 Hicks, supra note 107, at 537-38.  Hicks further argues that the Free Exercise Clause provides no refuge for 
these parents, relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 206 U.S. 205 (1972).  Smith interpreted Yoder to be a “hybrid” rights 
case, which is outside the scope of this Article. 
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by professional associations targeted explicitly at reparative therapy.115  Even if reparative 
therapy is found not to be predominantly religious at this stage, under this paradigm, religious 
organizations have the incentive to rely less on a cloak of science and more upon religious 
characterizations of reparative therapy in the long run.  By cementing reparative therapy as a 
religious practice, this would provide talismanic protection from government regulation116—any 
regulation against reparative therapy would immediately constitute a selectively burdensome 
regulation. 
 
2.  White supremacist literature 
 
Although racial supremacy is no longer a part of conservative Christianity, one case 
involving racial supremacy serves to illustrate this anomalous incentive to sanctify the secular.  
One recent Sixth Circuit decision struck down a federal statute partly on the grounds that it was 
encouraging such behavior.117  Although it was not a free exercise case, it still illustrates a 
parallel situation.  A provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners’ exercise 
of religion without a compelling interest.  This “has the effect of encouraging prisoners to 
become religious in order to enjoy greater rights.”118  For instance, to borrow the court’s 
hypothetical, a prison may have a policy of confiscating white supremacist literature.  Under the 
provision, one prisoner is allowed to keep white supremacist literature because of his 
membership of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, Aryan Nation.  Another prisoner, on the 
other hand, has his white supremacist literature confiscated because of his anti-Semitic views.  In 
the long run, the latter supremacists will have an incentive to join the Church or claim religiously 
motivated belief in order to gain protection. 
 
3.  Teaching “intelligent design” 
 
Lastly, consider the debate over whether a public school should teach “intelligent design” 
in conjunction with evolution, a debate currently raging across the country.119  If a local school 
board specifically decides to teach only evolution and reject the teaching of intelligent design, 
such a move prohibits conservative Christian teachers who want to teach evolution as simply a 
                                                          
115 It is constitutional for states to rely on the standards promulgated by private professional associations.  See Board 
of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 96-97 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (noting that “courts 
have sometimes upheld legislative adoption of private organizations’ standards which are periodically subject to 
revision, in limited circumstances such as where the standards are issued by a well-recognized, independent 
authority, and provide guidance on technical and complex matters within the entity’s area of expertise.  These cases 
usually involve accreditation or similar programs by established professional organizations”); Lucas v. Maine 
Com’n of Pharmacy, 472 A.2d 904, 909 (Me. 1984) (applying the principle that, “’statutes whose operation depends 
upon private action which is taken for purposes which are independent of the statute’ usually pass constitutional 
muster”) (quoting Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3:12 (2d ed. 1978)). 
116 This scenario does not apply to Christian Scientist parents whose use of faith healing on their children results in 
death, because they are generally prosecuted under state manslaughter statutes, which are neutral and generally 
applicable.  Where child neglect is at issue, Christian Scientists are often protected by explicit statutory exemptions 
for faith healing.  See generally Daniel Vaillant, The Prosecution of Christian Scientists: A Needed Protection for 
Children or Insult Added to Injury?, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 479 (2000). 
117 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003). 
118 Id. at 266. 
119 See Jerry Adler, Doubting Darwin, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6884904/site/newsweek/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
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theory or who also want to teach intelligent design.  Despite the history of teaching evolution in 
public schools, if a conservative Christian teacher can establish the questioning of evolution or 
the teaching of intelligent design as central to conservative Christianity, then such a school 
policy can be construed as a selectively burdensome regulation.120   
 
4.  Disingenuous claims? 
  
One might object that despite the fact that the sincerity inquiry does not apply,121 as a 
general matter, judges can still easily see through disingenuous characterizations of various 
activities as religious for the sake of forcing a selectively burdensome regulation.122  However, 
this objection overlooks two important facts.  First, even the most “disingenuous” 
characterization of an act as predominantly religious is still based on substantial actual facts.  It 
is difficult to imagine a situation whereby religious lawyers conspire with religious organizations 
to transform wholesale historically secular activities into religious ones over a period of years in 
order to win on an obscure legal point.  On the contrary, such activities are already becoming 
increasingly religious on their own accord – the incentive of the selectively burdensome 
regulation doctrine is simply for lawyers to characterize such acts as predominantly religious, 
rather than to actually effectuate the “religionizing” of previously secular activities, were that to 
even be possible for lawyers to do.  In the end, such “disingenuous” characterizations are just as 
“disingenuous” as the creative lawyering that already occurs in litigation. 
 
B.  Construing Political Disagreement as Religious Animus 
 
The erosion of the centrality concern by Lukumi’s denunciation of regulations motivated 
by animus creates a similar incentive.123  As stated previously, if there is evidence of legislative 
“animus” against a set of actions and/or ideologies, no religious animus exists unless the plaintiff 
can show an integral link between those actions/ideologies and the religion itself.  In other words, 
plaintiffs must construe, whether in good faith or otherwise, those actions/ideologies as central to 
their religion.  The implications of this anomaly may not be as clear with a relatively unfamiliar 
minority religion, because one does not know enough about the religion to differentiate between 
activities that are central and activities that are not central to that religion.  For example, in 
Lukumi, that the action/ideology of animal sacrifice was inextricably linked with the religion of 
Santeria was not controversial. 
The link between a religion’s actions/ideology and the religion itself is not as obvious, 
however, when it comes to majoritarian religions such as conservative Christianity.  Every 
religion possesses a worldview that is meant to color every aspect of daily life, yet it is only as 
the religion becomes more familiar and its adherents more numerous that society actually begins 
to notice and feel the nuanced implications of that worldview.  At this point, two trends naturally 
                                                          
120 If there are other teachers of other religions who wish to teach intelligent design or publicly question evolution, 
they too would have to show that those activities were central to their religion (i.e. conservative Islam, etc.). 
121 See supra Part I.C.1. (discussing difference between sincerity inquiry and inquiry into the claim that a regulation 
is selectively burdensome). 
122 See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Meyers’ professed beliefs have an ad 
hoc quality that neatly justify his desire to smoke marijuana.”). 
123 Some of the examples used in this section are interchangeable with the examples in the previous section, since all 
involve some kind of incentive to portray an activity as central to religion.  The use of example is simply to illustrate 
how this incentive is applied in these two separate doctrinal contexts. 
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occur.  First, as the actions or ideologies of the religion increasingly influence mainstream 
society, opponents emerge.  Second, as the actions and ideologies increasingly pervade spheres 
of daily life where secularism traditionally reigned, the link between such actions or ideologies 
and the religion becomes more attenuated from the perspective of the religious outsider, because 
she is used to seeing such a sphere in secular terms.  Given these two conditions in a democratic 
society, opponents will then attack the actions or ideology emanating from the religion.  If the 
religious adherents raise a free exercise charge of animus, it is precisely at this point where they 
must construe those actions or ideologies as central to their religion to prevail.124 
 
1.  The ideology that homosexuality is sin 
 
One ideology that is commonly attacked is the belief that homosexuality is wrong, and 
the denunciation of this ideology motivates some state actions.  However, once again, 
conservative Christians can make out animus claims by construing such beliefs as being central 
to their religion.  For instance, San Francisco city officials passed resolutions in 1998 
denouncing a full-page advertisement created by religious organizations claiming that 
homosexuals could walk out of homosexuality with the help of Jesus Christ.125  Although the city 
resolutions focused its attacks on the specific ideology that homosexuality was wrong, Judge 
Noonan, citing the animus section of Lukumi, still construed such resolutions as a “direct attack” 
against conservative Christians.126   
Consider also the nascent development of state antidiscrimination laws for private 
voucher schools.  Michael Kavey argues that state antidiscrimination laws prohibiting private 
voucher schools from discriminating against students based on sexual orientation can survive a 
free exercise challenge.127  However, the political situation surrounding the development of these 
antidiscrimination laws provides a fertile ground for potential animus counterarguments.  Kavey 
notes that only four states have voucher antidiscrimination statutes on the books, and that civil 
rights groups are pushing for increased protection.128  If conservative Christians could obtain 
                                                          
124 The principle that natural disagreement can be easily confused with animus finds a parallel in antitrust law.  Just 
as a democracy encourages competitive, sometimes fierce, political debate, the free market also encourages 
competitiveness.  Arguing against the proposition that courts should look at intent in antitrust law, Judge 
Easterbrook noted:  “[A] drive to succeed lies at the core of a rivalrous economy.  A desire to extinguish one’s 
rivals is entirely consistent with, often is the motive behind, competition.  If courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of 
sales as evidence of a forbidden ‘intent’, they run the risk of penalizing the motive forces of competition.  Finally, 
looking for intent also complicates litigation.  Lawyers rummage through business records seeking to discover 
tidbits that will sound impressive (or aggressive) when read to a jury.”  THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 678 (2001) (paraphrasing A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989). 
125 “What happened to Matthew Shepard is in part due to the message being espoused by your groups . . . .  It is not 
an exaggeration to say that there is a direct correlation between these acts of discrimination, such as when gays and 
lesbians are called sinful and when major religious organizations say they can change if they tried, and the horrible 
crimes committed against gays and lesbians.” Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 
1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). 
126 “To assert that a group’s religious message and religious categorization of conduct are responsible for murder is 
to attack the group’s religion. . . . The way that the city found to rebuke the plaintiffs was to assert that their message 
was murderous.  It is difficult to think of a more direct attack.”  Id. at 1126-27 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
127 Michael Kavey, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right to Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743 
(2003). 
128 Id. at 746-47. 
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evidence of comments directed against the ideology of homosexuality’s sinfulness, an animus 
argument could be made by establishing the link between that ideology and the religion. 
 
2.  The action of proselytizing 
 
An action that is often the source of regulatory controversy in the conservative Christian 
context is proselytizing, usually in the workplace, where it is discouraged or prohibited.129  This 
includes proselytizing to clients130 or coworkers.131  Proselytizing can also take various forms, 
each of which has elicited different levels of opprobrium.  A conservative Christian may seek to 
verbally convert someone to one’s faith, either on the Christian’s own initiative132 or in the 
context of a deeply personal conversation initiated by someone else.133  Proselytizing can include 
the use of music or media134 or it may take the simple form of a religious greeting.135  Policies 
against proselytizing justify themselves on varying rationales such as protecting clients from 
“distress,”136 “avoiding a disruption of the workplace, maintaining efficiency in the 
workplace,”137 maintaining “appropriate” interactions with customers,138 satisfying customer 
preferences,139 and protecting coworkers from “harassment.”140 
                                                          
129 The right to proselytize in the name of religious freedom and its potentially harmful effects is an important legal 
and ethical controversy worldwide.  See generally John Witte, Jr., Human Rights and the Right to Proselytize: 
Inherent Contradictions?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 182 (2000).  The right to proselytize is usually associated 
with Title VII employment discrimination on the basis of religion or freedom of speech, not the free exercise of 
religion. See, e.g., Michael D. Moberly, Bad News For Those Proclaiming the Good News?: The Employer’s 
Ambiguous Duty to Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing right to 
proselytize in context of Title VII); Zachary E. Pelham, Comment, Constitutional Law—Freedom of Speech: Door-
to-Door Permit Requirements for Noncommercial Canvassers, Domestic Threat or Freedom of Speech?, 79 N.D. L. 
REV. 369 (2003) (discussing proselytizing door-to-door as freedom of speech issue).  Since this Article adopts the 
position of much of legal scholarship that the “hybrid-rights” doctrine is (or should be) impotent, see supra note
37, this Article does not discuss the possibility of raising a “hybrid” free exercise-free speech claim for proselytizing.  
See Ryan M. Akers, Begging the High Court for Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employment Division v. Smith, 
17 REGENT U. L. REV. 77, 89-90 (2004) (discussing lower court’s essential rejection of hybrid rights doctrine in 
proselytizing case). 
130 See, e.g., Knight v. Connecticut Department of Public Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001) (nurse consultant and 
sign language interpreter fired for proselytizing to clients). 
131 See, e.g., Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004) (evangelical Christian employee fired for 
violating company policy of “harassment” by proselytizing to coworker). 
132 See, e.g., Knight, 275 F.3d at 161 (describing Knight’s experiencing a “strong sense of compassion for both men 
and a ‘leading of the Holy Spirit’ to talk with the men regarding salvation”) (some quotations omitted); id. at 162 
(“During a break in the interpreting session, Quental spoke with the client about smoking.  She told the client that 
the Lord had delivered her from smoking.  She asked the client if she could pray for him so that he might also quit 
smoking.”) (some quotations omitted). 
133 See, e.g., Bodett, 366 F.3d at 741 (describing incident where coworker, in a “state of emotional distress,” asked 
for advice of the evangelical Christian plaintiff, at which point the plaintiff “made [the coworker] born again”).  
134 See, e.g., Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 1986) (hospital chaplain “preached and encouraged musical 
participation in a manner that [employer] interpreted as proselytizing” and failed to requisition a presumably 
inappropriate religious film). 
135 See, e.g., Banks v. Service America Corp., 952 F.Supp. 703. 707 (D. Kansas 1996) (employer “directed plaintiffs 
not to say ‘God bless you,’ ‘Praise the Lord’ or other similar phrases to food service customers”).  
136 Knight, 275 F.3d at 161. 
137 Id. at 163. 
138 Banks, 952 F.Supp. at 708. 
139 Id. at 709 n.5 (“Service America argues that its customers ‘may well and likely do include Christians, Jews, 
Moslems, atheists, and others, many of whom prefer not to be subjected to plaintiffs' religious beliefs’”). 
140 Bodett, 366 F.3d at 744. 
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If these justifications are used by government employers141 to attack proselytizing, these 
justifications can be used to make an animus claim by construing proselytizing as being central 
to the conservative Christian religion.142  The plausibility of such a scenario should not be 
underestimated, especially since Lawrence v. Texas143 suggested that moral disapproval could 
constitute animus.144  The problem with all of these justifications is that the harm they seek to 
protect against is offense.  It is offense that causes the distress, that disrupts workplace morale, 
that makes customers uncomfortable, and that makes proselytizing inappropriate.  It would not 
be difficult to construe an action that so offends people, particularly a societal majority, as moral 
disapproval. 
However, because “proselytizing” is quite a broad term and can take many forms, a 
slightly more practical approach from the perspective of conservative Christians would be to 
construe a specific type of proselytizing action as central to the conservative Christian religion, 
rather than proselytizing in general.  For example, in Henderson v. Kennedy,145 a group of 
evangelical Christians were prohibited from selling t-shirts on the National Mall.  They 
successfully persuaded the judge that proselytizing was central to their religion.  “[Plaintiffs] are 
obligated by the Great Commission to preach the good news, the gospel, of salvation through 
Jesus Christ to the whole world . . . by all available means.”146  However, because they did not 
“suggest that their religious beliefs demand that they sell t-shirts in every place human beings 
occupy or congregate,” their claim was rejected.147 
                                                          
141 “In most of the cases alleging religious discrimination under Title VII, the employer is a private entity rather than 
a government, and the first amendment to the Constitution is therefore not applicable to the employment 
relationship.”  Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995).  But see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 
506 (1946) (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more 
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”). 
142 Note the link between the action of proselytizing and the religion created by construing the action as central to 
the religion.  See, e.g., Baz, 782 F.2d at 703 (“The crux of the plaintiff's problems lay in his relationship with the 
patients and with the medical staff and in plaintiff's view of his ministry and his calling to preach the Gospel”); 
Banks, 952 F.Supp. at 707 (“Plaintiffs are Christians who feel strongly that because of what God has done for them 
and the joy He has given them by changing their lives dramatically, they must say things that are positive, uplifting 
and inspirational to people with whom they speak, and their religious greetings emanate from this belief”). 
143 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
144 See generally Suzanne Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications For Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. 
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004).  Kennedy has given strong indications that he does not believe that moral 
disapproval is sufficient to justify a law.  This is evidenced by his imputation of animus on the Hialeah city council’s 
moral disapproval in Lukumi. the equal protection case of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (construing 
Colorado’s moral disapproval of homosexuality as animus), and his views expressed in Lawrence, which rejected an 
anti-sodomy statute because it was based on the rationale that homosexuality was immoral.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (“The fact that a State's governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice 
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”).  O’Connor more explicitly 
stated that under equal protection law, morals-based rationales are doctrinally equivalent to animus:  “Moral 
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational 
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Such equal protection 
rulings are relevant since Lukumi held that equal protection cases could serve as guidance for free exercise cases. 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993). 
145 253 F.3d 12 (D.C.Cir. 2001). 
146 Henderson, 253 F.3d at 16. 
147 Id.  This case was not a free exercise case, but a case based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 
which prohibited the state or federal government from placing a substantial burden on religion without a compelling 
state interest.  Because this statute was passed after Smith in order to resurrect the Sherbert test, the reasoning of this 
case is relevant since it has been shown that Sherbert’s preservation concern is alive and well today.  (The Supreme 
Rise and Fall of the Centrality Concern in Free Exercise Jurisprudence Sean J. Young 
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 In sum, with Lukumi’s animus doctrine undermining the centrality concern and the fact 
that majoritarian religions’ influence may be felt in all manner of daily life, there are numerous 
possible opportunities in a democracy for members of majoritarian religions to make plausible 




It is time for the Court to realize that regardless of the intellectual appeal of the centrality 
concern, it is simply not sustainable, if only because lower courts and the Supreme Court itself 
do not even seem to have the desire nor the will to sustain it.  Rather than replacing Smith with a 
new test that could potentially lead to more chaos, a temporary return to Sherbert’s test would be 
the best short-term solution since judges are apparently still under its influence.   
This should be immediately followed by an effort to define “religion” in the free exercise 
context.  There is no reason why courts are entirely comfortable interpreting what “religion” 
means in federal law148 and yet abdicate their interpreter role when it comes to the supreme law 
of the land.  Scholars and judges alike should make a concerted effort to pursue such a 
definition,149 which will also help curtail the anomalous incentive for majoritarian religions to 
rhetorically construe any manner of activity as central to their religion.  Defining religion would 
also prevent the legitimate fear that “professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of 
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”150 
The animus inquiry must also be expelled from free exercise doctrine.  As we have seen, 
a flourishing democracy inevitably results in a plethora of attacks against the actions and 
ideologies of innumerable political, philosophical, or special interest groups.  Religion, 
majoritarian or not, does not deserve special protection in this context.  Policymakers should be 
free to criticize the actions151 and ideologies that might emanate from religion without fearing 
that their comments would be construed to attacking the religion itself or its adherents by an 
inappropriate centrality claim.  Otherwise, debate will be significantly chilled. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Court struck down RFRA as it applied to state governments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), but 
did not reach the issue of RFRA as it applied to the federal government, which is why this case proceeded). 
148 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (defining “religion” in Universal Military Training and 
Service Act); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (same); Brown v. Pena, 441 F.Supp. 1382 (S.D.Fla. 1977) 
(defining “religion” in Title VII); Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D.Wis. 2002) 
(same); and United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (defining “religion” in Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act).  
149 There are a few appropriate starting points for such an endeavor.  The most popular legal definition of religion is 
the “functionalist” definition.  See also Lawrence Tribe, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1056, 1075 (1978).  But see John C. Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know If It’s 
Established?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 527 (2003) (criticizing functionalist definition).  Another starting point would 
be Judge Adams’ concurrence in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) and a more modern application in 
Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483-84 (listing 15-factor test).   
150 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879). 
151 As previously stated, animus towards a gender can also include animus towards the gender’s “actions” in the 
form of gender stereotyping.  This can also be applied to race, where animus towards a set of actions that are 
inextricably tied to race can be construed as animus against that race.  This Article does not address those instances, 
but it is worth observing that unlike religion, gender or race does not possess an “ideology.”  
